In this paper we analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the size distribution of …rms.
Introduction
In recent years, several environmental regulations have been introduced to control emissions of several pollutants. These policies have a clear objective: to induce …rms to reduce emissions by investing in cleaner/energy-saving technologies and promoting industrial turnover by modifying, among other things, the possibility of entry of new …rms, exit of incumbent …rms, and the relative competitive advantage of active …rms. Environmental regulations may also a¤ect the distribution of market shares and the related size distribution of …rms if compliance changes the optimal plant size. As pointed out by Evans (1986) , the di¤erential e¤ect of regulation across …rm size is important since society may have an interest in preserving small businesses because of antitrust or other noneconomic reasons.
When there are scale economies in regulatory compliance, it might be optimal to exempt or impose lighter regulatory burden on smaller …rms, or design regulations that are neutral across …rm size to minimize the disproportionate impact of environmental regulatory requirements on small businesses (see also Brock and Evans 1985) . The incidence of regulatory costs across …rm size may also tell us something about the interest of certain groups of businesses in supporting alternative regulatory policies.
The size distribution of …rms has been extensively studied in the industrial organization literature.
Most of the literature deals with the distributional properties of …rm size (see, e.g., Cabral and Mata 2003 and Angelini and Generale 2008) . However, more recent research has integrated the size distribution of …rms into standard economic theory. Attempts to explain the size dynamics have investigated the e¤ects of bad productivity shocks (Hopenhayn 1992 and Ericson and Pakes 1995) , learning (Jovanovic 1982) , ine¢ ciencies in …nancial markets (Clementi and Hopenhayn 2006) , the exogenous distribution of managerial ability in the population (Lucas 1978 and Garicano and RossiHansberg 2004) , and the e¢ cient accumulation and allocation of factors of production (Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2007) .
In the environmental economics literature, some studies have identi…ed two counteracting e¤ects through which environmental policies a¤ect the distribution of size. First, the studies by Pashigian 2 (1984), Dean et al. (2000) , and Sengupta (2010) indicate that due to economies of scale, environmental regulation modi…es the optimal scale of …rms and puts small …rms at a unit cost disadvantage. Second, Becker et al. (2013) argue that there are statutory and/or enforcement asymmetries that favor smaller establishments. Hence, the …nal incidence of environmental regulations depends on whether these regulatory asymmetries outweigh any scale economies in regulatory compliance. In this paper, we study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of …rms. We …nd that the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects is quite dependent on the type of environmental policies in place since di¤erent environmental policies redistribute intra-industry rents di¤erently. Moreover, over time, di¤erent regulations might lead to a di¤erent distribution of the share of polluting inputs in the production process as they foster investments in di¤erent advanced technologies to di¤erent extents.
To study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of …rms, we follow the seminal model by Lucas (1978) , where the underlying size distribution of …rms in the industry is the result of the existence of a productive factor of heterogenous productivity. In Lucas'model, such a factor is the managerial technology, while in ours it is the energy e¢ ciency of …rms. 1 In such a setting, we introduce di¤erent environmental policies and analyze the resulting size distributions, as well as the variations in size distribution that arise as a result of investments that reduce the cost of compliance with environmental regulations. The heterogeneity of the available physical capital with respect to energy intensity is well established in the literature. Small …rms typically spend more of their operating costs on energy than do large …rms due to the lack of knowledge about and expected pro…tability of available energy-e¢ cient technologies (de Groot at al. 2001 and Ruth et al. 2004 ).
We compare three environmental policies, namely emission taxes, emission standards, and performance standards. As shown in the paper, under emission taxes and performance standards, the intensity of emissions is determined by the stringency of the regulation and it is the same across 1 Our model also resembles that of Melitz (2003) , who derives a simple model of industry equilibrium in an open economy with heterogeneous …rms. Firms di¤er in terms of their marginal productivity of labor (the only factor of production). The productivity of each …rm is randomly drawn from some distribution, but unlike our model, …rms do not know their productivity prior to starting production. One of the predictions of the Melitz model is that opening up to trade will increase aggregate productivity. 3 …rms. In contrast, under emission standards, the regulatory goal is expressed as an absolute emission limit, which favors smaller …rms as the limit might not bind their emissions. Our results indicate that emission taxes and performance standards do not introduce regulatory asymmetries, but do modify the optimal scale of the …rms. Moreover, the existence of economies of scale implies that these policies reduce to a lower extent pro…ts for larger …rms than for smaller …rms. Further, emission taxes reduce the pro…ts of larger …rms to a larger extent than performance standards. However, when it comes to emission standards, the incidence of the regulatory costs across …rm size depends on the two counteracting e¤ects described above. In line with Becker et al. (2013) , our results indicate that emission standards create regulatory asymmetries as they distort the emission intensity of large …rms the most.
This e¤ect is likely to exceed the economies of scale e¤ect, implying that emission standards reduce the pro…ts of large …rms to a larger extent. Finally, unlike previous studies suggesting that marketbased instruments create more e¤ective technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory standards, 2 our results indicate that when the regulatory asymmetries created by emissions standards are taken into account, the pro…tability of emission saving biased technological change is higher under emission standards than under market-based instruments.
The paper is organized in six sections. The next section presents the model and the underlying size distribution of …rms in the absence of environmental policies. The third section analyzes the incidence of regulatory costs across size and how the choice of a policy instrument modi…es the size distribution of …rms. The fourth section analyzes the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the share of the polluting input and technological choice. The …fth section presents some numerical simulations and analyzes welfare implications. The …nal section concludes.
The Model
We assume a perfectly competitive stationary industry consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral singleplant polluting …rms of mass 1. Firms produce a homogeneous good using two inputs: energy (e) 2 There is a large body of research analyzing the incentives provided by di¤erent environmental policy instruments for adoption of advanced abatement technology. See Requate (2005) for a review. 4 and labor (l). Moreover, each unit of energy e used as an input generates units of emissions , i.e., i = e i . Firms di¤er in terms of the parameter , which re ‡ects energy e¢ ciency and is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval ; .
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology, the production function of …rm i is then characterized as:
where q is the amount of output produced by a …rm using e units of energy and l units of labor, i is the energy e¢ ciency of …rm i, and is a technology index. In the absence of environmental regulation, …rm i maximizes net pro…ts
through the choice of inputs:
We assume that 2 + < 1, which means that the demand of energy is a concave function of the energy e¢ ciency.
Replacing equations (6) and (7) in equations (1) and (2), we can solve for individual output and pro…ts as:
From equations (8) and (9), it is possible to see that output and pro…ts increase as energy e¢ ciency i increases. Firm i would operate in this market as long as its pro…ts are larger than F . Consistent with this, in the continuum of …rms the minimum energy e¢ ciency
satis…es the condition N R ( 0 ) = F , or:
Thus, the energy e¢ ciency of the …rms operating in the market is uniformly distributed on the i , which leads to:
Let h = i 1
1
. The solution to equation (11) can be represented as:
To compute total output with no regulation Q N R , we integrate (8) over the interval
i , which leads to:
Dividing 
Environmental Regulation
Let us now analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the size distribution in equilibrium. We assume that given the initial size distribution of …rms, the regulatory goal is to limit aggregate emissions at some exogenously given level E by means of one of the following three regulatory instruments:
a per-unit emission tax , a uniform emission standard , and a uniform performance standard that de…nes the maximum intensity of emissions . Finally, we assume that the stringency of each policy remains unchanged regardless of the e¤ects of the instruments on the initial size distribution of …rms.
Emission Taxes
In the case of emission taxes, …rm i maximizes its pro…ts
where b = is the tax per unit of energy.
The FOCs are:
Dividing by parts, we obtain:
Substituting equation (16) 
Replacing equations (17) and (18) in equations (1) and (13), we can solve for individual output and pro…ts as:
The cuto¤ value of the energy e¢ ciency in the case of taxes T 0 satis…es the condition
which yields:
By simple inspection of equations (10) and (21), it is easy to see that
Moreover, as in the previous case, we can compute aggregate emissions and output under taxes
by integrating individual emissions and output over the range
where
Thus, the average emission intensity in the industry correspond to (9), it is easy to show that T i is given by:
Moreover, let
> 0 represent the percentage reduction in …rm i's pro…ts under emissions taxation vis-a-vis no regulation. To study the incidence of the regulatory costs of environmental taxation across …rm size, we compute the …rst and second order derivative of T i with regard to i , which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Emission taxes reduce by a larger percentage pro…ts for smaller …rms than for larger …rms.
Proof. Substituting equation (24) in T i and di¤erentiating with respect to i yields:
Hence, T i decreases at decreasing rate as i increases, implying that in relative terms, emission taxes increase the cost of compliance (and thus reduce the pro…ts) of the smaller …rms more than they reduce the pro…ts of larger …rms. The intuition behind this result is the existence of economies of scale. As mentioned before, under emission taxes the energy and emission intensity of each …rm in the industry is the same at the margin. However, in absolute terms, large …rms produce more ouput and release more emissions. The …xed cost F puts the smaller …rms at a unit cost disadvantage; the normalized …xed cost 
Emission Standard
Under a uniform emission standard, the government restricts the individual emissions generated during the production process to the level . In our setting, this restriction is equivalent to a restriction on the use of the energy input. Thus, …rm i maximizes pro…ts given by the constraint i ; or:
Since the standard is uniform and …rms are heterogenous, we should expect it to be binding only for some …rms. Taking the case without regulation as the baseline, we should expect the standard to be binding if
. If the standard is not binding, the choice of inputs proceeds as in the case without regulation. If the standard is binding, the FOC wrt l i is:
while the energy to labor ratio is equal to:
Substituting l S i and e S i in equations (1) and (25) yields to output and pro…ts for those …rms for which the standard is binding:
In order to compare environmental policies, we assume that aggregate emissions under the emission standard and emission tax are equivalent ex-ante. Therefore, we can solve for by integrating emissions over the range
i and equalizing this to T in equation (22), which leads to the following condition:
Therefore, the standard can be represented as:
de…nes whether the standard is binding. The critical value b 1 corresponds to: (6) and (8), respectively. The average (and individual) emission intensity in this interval is the same as in the case without regulation and equal to given by:
Moreover, let Like in the case of taxation, the second e¤ect, the scale e¤ect (SE), is negative and captures the fact that the …xed cost F puts the smaller …rms at a unit cost disadvantage, and hence, vis-a-vis no regulation, the pro…ts of the smaller …rms are reduced to a larger extent than those of larger …rms.
We can show that the regulatory asymmetry e¤ect is larger than the scale e¤ect implying that pro…ts under emission standards are reduced by a larger percentage for larger …rms than for smaller …rms (see appendix A). Moreover, di¤erentiating
with respect to i yields:
As in the case of taxes we can show that
Hence, the scale e¤ect decreases at a decreasing rate since the use of energy is a concave function of the energy e¢ ciency. The derivative
is given by:
13 That is, if i > b 1 , the regulatory asymmetry e¤ect increases at an increasing rate as i increases.
Since the …rst part of the
(@ i ) 2 is negative and the second part is positive, the sign of the
ambiguous.
Performance Standard
Under a performance standard, emission intensity is …xed by policy at i qi . Firms can meet partly this restriction by reducing emissions in the numerator and partly by increasing output in the denominator. In our setting, this restriction is equivalent to a restriction on the use of input energy equal to e i 1 q i . Thus, …rm i maximizes
If the constraint is binding, the choice of the energy input is given by:
or:
and the pro…t maximization problem becomes:
Substituting equation (33) into equation (34) and solving the FOC wrt l i yields:
14 Substituting equation (35) into equation (33), we solve for e P S i as:
where e P S i
Finally, substituting l
P S i
and e
in (34) yields:
As in the case of the emission standard, we assume that aggregate emissions under the performance standard and the emission tax are equivalent ex-ante. Therefore, the performance standard is equal to the average emission intensity under taxes and corresponds to = 
As usual, aggregate emissions under performance standard P S are calculated by integrating individual emissions
over the range
i , which leads to: 
Proof. Substituting equation (41) in

P S i
and di¤erentiating with respect to i yields:
Like in the case of emission taxes,
decreases at a decreasing rate as i increases, implying that in relative terms, performance standards increase the cost of compliance (and thus reduce the pro…ts) of the larger …rms to a lower extent. As in the case of emission taxes, the emission intensity of each …rm in the industry is the same at the margin and given by the regulation. The regressive incidence of performance standards is explained by the existence of economies of scale. This e¤ect decreases at a decreasing rate since the use of energy is a concave function of the energy e¢ ciency:
Proposition 4 Emission taxes reduce the pro…ts of larger …rms by a larger percentage than do performance standards.
Proof. The condition (38) We can see that
. Replacing we have that this condition simpli…es to:
which is true since 0 < < 1. Hence, and not surprisingly, emission taxes reduce …rm pro…ts by larger percentage. As pointed out by Fullerton and Heutel (2010) a restriction on emissions per unit of output is equivalent to a combination of a tax on emissions and subsidy to output. The actual cost of the regulation is larger under emission taxes since …rms must pay the tax for each unit of emissions they release. Instead, under performance standards, …rms are granted q
units of emission free of charge.
The higher the level of output q P S i , the larger the amount of emissions granted free of charge. Hence, as i increases, and so does output, the actual cost of the regulation under performance standard decreases, implying that vis-a-vis taxation performance standards reduce the pro…ts of larger …rms by a lower percentage than do emission taxes.
Proposition 5
We have the following ranking regarding how environmental policies modify the optimal scale of …rms.
(a) The minimum optimal …rm size is larger under emission taxes and performance standards than under no regulation. Further, the minimum optimal …rm size is larger under emission taxes than under performance standards, i.e.,
(b) There is a critical threshold b 1 that de…nes whether emission standards are binding. Since
0 , it follows that emission standards do not a¤ect the minimum optimal …rm size.
Proof. (a) Comparing equations [10] and [21]
, it is easy to show that for any^ > 0;
Comparing equations [21] and [39] , it follows that
which holds since 0 < < 1: Hence,
As shown above, since emission taxes reduce …rm pro…ts by a larger percentage, the marginal …rm in the case of taxation should be more energy e¢ cient than the corresponding one in the case of performance standards.
(b) We show in page 11 that emission standards are binding only for larger …rms. A more formal proof is provided in the Appendix B.
Finally, since
, it can be shown that aggregate emissions are higher under performance standards than under emission taxes, i.e., P S > T . Indeed, P S > T if:
which simpli…es to:
This inequality holds since
The Choice of Policy Instruments and the Distribution of Factors
To analyze the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the distribution of factors, we model the choice between two technologies. In particular, technology 1 (T 1 ) increases the technology index from to^ , while technology 2 (T 2 ) reduces the generation of emissions per unit of energy from to~ .
From the analysis above, recall that if the regulations are binding, individual emissions, the energy to labor ratio and individual emission intensity under emission taxes (T), emission standards (S) and performance standard (PS) correspond to: 
Hence, under taxes and performance standards, individual emissions increase when increases.
However, the …rms' relative use of inputs and emission intensity do not depend on . In contrast, under emission standards the …rms' relative use of energy and emission intensity are reduced if increases. has no e¤ect on individual emissions if the standard is binding.
Under taxes and emission standards, T 2 increases the …rms'relative use of energy while reducing the emission intensity (as well as individual emissions in the case of taxes). Finally, under performance standards, T 2 increases individual emissions and the …rms' relative use of energy but has no e¤ect on the emission intensity, which is …xed by the regulation. However, if the adoption of T 2 makes the standard no-binding, the emission intensity is reduced to p e z and the energy to labor ratio is increased to
All in all, the technologies a¤ect individual emissions, the relative use of inputs, and emission intensity di¤erently depending on the policy instrument in place. However, for simplicity, let us refer to T 1 as a neutral technical change (which holds for all cases but the emission standards) and T 2 as an emission-saving technological change. Without loss of generality, we assume that both options have the same investment cost G, and normalize to 1, meaning that^ = and~ < 1: We also assume that both technologies are pro…table and focus instead on the choice of technology to understand how the distribution of factors is a¤ected by the choice of di¤erent environmental policies.
Emission Taxes
Let T i (^ ; ) represent …rm i's pro…ts from adoption of T 1 . Using equation (20), T i (^ ; ) can be represented as:
Pro…ts from adoption of T 2 can be represented as
where~ = ~ , and = G F > 0.
From these equations we can show that T 1 is most pro…table when the technology index b exceeds a critical threshold given by T = h z+ z+~ i . For^ = T , both technologies are equally pro…table, while T 2 is more pro…table if^ < T .
Emission Standards
From equation (29) we can see that if the standard is binding, the pro…ts from adopting T 1 can be represented as:
Pro…ts from adopting T 2 can be represented as:
Like in the previous case, there is critical threshold S =~ that de…nes which technology is the most pro…table. T 1 is more pro…table than T 2 when^ > S , while the reverse holds for^ < S . For^ = S , both technologies are equally pro…table.
Performance Standards
Finally, from equation (38) we can see that the pro…ts from adoption of T 1 can be represented as:
Pro…ts from adoption of T 2 can be represented as:
Again, there is a critical threshold
that de…nes which technology is the most pro…table. Investment in T 1 is more pro…table than T 2 when^ > P S , while the reverse holds for^ < P S . For^ = P S , both technologies are equally pro…table.
Proposition 6 Compared with neutral technological change, the pro…tability of emission-saving technological change is the highest under emission standards, followed by emission taxes and performance standards.
Proof. Comparing the thresholds we can show that:
e , which holds since~ < 1.
, which holds since < 1.
Hence, it follows that^
This result is interesting. As discussed above, emission standards distort the choice of inputs the most, a¤ecting quite signi…cantly the pro…ts of those …rms for which the standard is binding. T 2 allows …rms to increase the use of the energy input, reducing the shadow cost of the regulation. The …nding that T 2 is most likely to be adopted under emission standards goes against previous studies suggesting that market-based instruments create more e¤ective technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory standards (see Requate 2005 for a survey). This result relies on the logic that under emission standards, the incentive for adoption is given by the increased pro…ts resulting from using new technology when …rms are restricted to emit no more than . In comparison, under marketbased instruments, …rms would instead increase their emission reductions even further to reduce tax payments. Our analysis shows, however, that when the regulatory asymmetries created by emission standards are taken into account, the pro…tability of emission-saving-biased technological change is higher under emission standards than under market-based instruments. The most productive …rms are more likely to invest in new technology. Under emission standards they are the …rms that face the larger percentage reduction in pro…ts due to the regulation, and hence bene…t the most from investing in T 2 .
Finally, the …nding that adoption of T 2 is more likely under emission taxes than under performance standard is in line with Proposition 4. For equivalent stringencies of these policy instruments, …rms face a larger percentage reduction in pro…ts under emission taxes, which creates incentives to invest in technologies that reduce the cost of the regulation.
Numerical Example
In this section we present a numerical example of the size distribution induced by the di¤erent policies under analysis. We provide values for some of our key parameters and calculate the resulting choice of inputs, pro…ts, and aggregate emissions and output. The production elasticity of emissions and labor is set at = 0:2 and = 0:5; respectively. The general productivity parameter, ; is equal to 2: The price of the output is set at p = 5; while the wages and the price of energy are set at w = 1 and z = 1:6; respectively. We set the emission tax at = 0:2 and the …xed entry cost of …rms at F = 21: Finally, we assume that the initial number of Using the parameter values presented in Table 2 , we study the size distribution of …rms under di¤erent environmental regulations. Table 3 as illustrated in Figure 1 . Finally, the cuto¤ value in the case of performance standards is equal to 0.28, which implies that …rms in the interval [0:28; 0:3) will still …nd it pro…table to operate under performance standards but not under taxes.
When it comes to output, it is clear from Table 3 that output is higher under performance standards than under taxation, which is easily explained if we take into account that …rms pay taxes for the total emissions they generate, while in the case of performance standards …rms are granted a certain number of emissions free of charge. The lowest level of total output is observed in the case of emission standards, since the larger …rms that used to produce a lot are now restricted by the regulation. Given the speci…c parameter values assumed here, we can rank the total output under the four regimes as Figure 1 presents the emissions generated by each type of …rm. To start with the aggregate amount, we have that N R > P S > T > S : So, emission standards result in lower levels of emissions than taxes and performance standards. Emission standards lead to the same emission level as with non-regulation when the standard is not binding, but there is a signi…cant decrease in the emissions generated by the …rms for which the standard is binding. Compared with taxes, emissions are higher under performance standards (as expected). Table 3 also shows the average emissions-output ratio. We can see that the average emission intensity is lowest under emission standards, followed by taxes and performance standards, i.e., ( =Q)
Again, this ranking is explained by the signi…cant e¤ect of emission standards on the emission intensity of large …rms.
When it comes to welfare e¤ects, Table 3 provides the values of a welfare indicator equal to aggregate pro…ts of active …rms under the di¤erent policy instruments. In calculating our indicator in the case of taxes, we sum back aggregate tax payments as they only represent a transfer between …rms and the government. This is to say, they should not be considered as a reduction in aggregate pro…ts. Further, the aggregate pro…ts in the case of emission standards correspond to the weighted average of the pro…ts of those …rms for which the standard is not binding and those for which the standard is binding. Two factors determine the observed di¤erences in aggregate pro…ts: (i) the cost of compliance of the di¤erent environmental policies and (ii) the di¤erent number of …rms exiting the market after the implementation of each environmental policy. Our numerical example provides the following ranking: W I N R > W I P S > W I T > W I ES : This means that performance standards lead to higher aggregate pro…ts, followed by emission taxes and emission standards. The fact that emission standards lead to lower pro…ts is interesting since …rms are not required to pay for their emissions in this case. However, the fact that the regulation signi…cantly a¤ects the choice of inputs and restricts …rms with the highest energy e¢ ciency implies that this policy has the most negative e¤ects on aggregate pro…ts, though it impacts small …rms to a lower extent. The extent to which our welfare indicator corresponds to actual welfare depends on the social cost of emissions. If we would assume, for example, that the cost of emissions is given by the tax (and that the marginal damage is constant), the welfare under taxes would be the largest, followed by performance standards and emission standards.
In order to illustrate Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we calculate the percentage gap in pro…ts under each policy instrument vis-a-vis no regulation, i.e.,
, _ j = T; S; P S. As we can see in Figure   2 , in relative terms, emission standards are much more stringent for larger …rms than for smaller …rms.
As expected, taxes and performance standards impose a higher cost to smaller …rms. Moreover, under performance standards large …rms lose a smaller part of their pro…ts (vis-a-vis no regulation) than under emission taxes. As discussed before, this is explained by the fact under taxes …rms have to pay for all the emissions they release, while in the case of performance standards emissions below the level imposed by the standard are free of charge.
Finally, in Table 3 we also present some numerical results for the two technology options. In particular, we compute the thresholds^ 
Conclusions
In this paper we study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of …rms.
We have shown that each regulation a¤ects …rms of heterogeneous size di¤erently, favoring either small or large …rms. For instance, compared with taxes or performance standards, uniform emission standards are much more stringent for larger …rms which despite using the output that generates emissions less intensively emit more than small …rms in absolute terms. Moreover, we have shown that a di¤erent number of …rms go out of business under di¤erent policy instruments.
To sum up, the internalization of the social cost coming from the polluting activity of …rms leads to lower production levels for each "type" of …rm. Emission taxes a¤ect small …rms with signi…cantly low surpluses (needed to cover the …xed costs) the most, as the use of energy now becomes more expensive. Emission standards a¤ect the most those large …rms for which the standard is binding.
These …rms would have to distort their choice of inputs signi…cantly as well as reduce their production and pro…ts in order to comply with the standard. Finally, performance standards favor large …rms 26 that produce high levels of output and do not …nd the regulation so restrictive. Moreover, compared with the other two policy instruments, they lead to a higher output (though at the expense of higher emissions). Last but not least, assuming that …rms can invest in two di¤erent technologies, a neutral technology and an emission-saving-biased technology, we show that emission standards favor the use of emissions-saving technologies the most.
The fact that each regulation a¤ects the size distribution di¤erently has important welfare consequences. In our setting, the underlying size distribution of …rms in the industry is the result of the existence of heterogeneity in available physical capital with respect to energy intensity. Any environmental policy introducing regulatory asymmetries favoring small …rms might have signi…cant detrimental e¤ects on total output and total welfare, yet it might also lead to reduced emissions and help preserve small businesses, which might be desirable because of antitrust of other non-economic reasons. Alternatively, one could exempt smaller …rms from the regulation, though this might create additional distortions and discontinuities on the size distribution -an interesting issue for future research. For the concavity condition to hold we need:
Combining conditions (A7) and (A8) yields:
Then the two conditions will hold simultaneously if and only if: 
Di¤erentiating equations (9) and (38) with respect to i and replacing in (A11) leads to:
